Lindsay Hoyle: Part of that information technology has been NHS Direct. Chorley was the pioneer of NHS Direct, but we found out today that the Chorley centre is about to close, along with Bolton and Preston. Who is in charge of the Department—the Ministers or the chief executive? There is something wrong when people in Preston and Bolton who are being made redundant may be allowed to go to a new site, yet the people of Chorley have not been given the same assurance. Why not? [Hon. Members: "Hear, hear."]

Andy Burnham: Primary care trusts determine how best to use the funds allocated to them to plan, develop and improve health services for their local populations. No meetings are arranged with representatives from NHS trusts in East Anglia at present, but as Minister with responsibility for the eastern region I expect to have meetings with representatives and to visit the region in the course of my work.

PRIMARY CARE TRUSTS AND AMBULANCE TRUSTS

Andy Burnham: With permission, Mr. Speaker, and in the unavoidable absence of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, I should like to make a statement on primary care trusts and NHS ambulance trusts. Detailed information for each area has, for the convenience of hon. Members, been placed on the Board since 1 pm.
	In my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State's written statement of 18 October 2005, she explained that strategic health authorities had been invited to submit proposals to the Department of Health on how to streamline SHAs and strengthen primary care trusts. Four clear criteria underpinned that exercise: the need to improve health and reduce inequalities; to strengthen the PCTs' commissioning function; to improve co-ordination with social services through greater coterminosity between PCT and local authority boundaries; and to deliver at least a 15 per cent. reduction in management and administrative costs.
	In the intervening period, SHAs have consulted local people, staff and clinicians, partners in local government and a range of other local stakeholders on the proposals for SHAs, PCTs and ambulance trusts. Many right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House have offered their views and I am very grateful to them. After local consultations, SHAs submitted their reports and recommendations to the Department. An external panel, established to advise Ministers on the proposals, has since met to consider in detail each proposal for PCTs and SHAs. After receiving its advice, we announced on 12 April that the numbers of SHAs would reduce from 28 to 10.
	Ministers have now considered the recommendations and the panel's advice on PCTs. I can now inform the House that the number of PCTs will fall from 303 to 152, and that the new organisations will be established on 1 October 2006. The population covered by each PCT will rise from an average of around 165,000 at present to an average of just below 330,000. About70 per cent. of the new PCTs will be coterminous with the boundaries of local authorities with social services responsibilities, which compares with about 44 per cent. of PCTs that are currently coterminous with their local authorities.
	In some areas, concerns have been expressed that larger PCTs could lose a locality focus and divert resources away from deprived areas or that smaller PCTs could lack commissioning power. We acknowledge those concerns and have sought to strike a careful balance between those conflicting demands. In response, we propose that four general conditions be applied: first, that all PCTs retain and build on partnership arrangements; secondly, that a strong locality focus must be retained and, where necessary, that local structures should be put in place; thirdly, that all PCTs must deliver their share of the 15 per cent. management cost saving, strengthen commissioning and ensure robust management of financial balance and risk; and fourthly, that the new PCTs and SHAs should consider how any further conditions relating to issues that arose during the consultation could be applied.
	In some areas, the new proposals differ from those suggested by the SHA and the external panel. Having taken into account all the evidence and sought local consensus wherever possible, we have judged that in those circumstances, the alternatives could better satisfy the "Commissioning a Patient-led NHS" criteria and have the best possible chance of success.
	On PCTs as providers of services, let me restate the then Secretary of State's clear commitment to the House on 25 October 2005. She said that
	"district nurses, health visitors and other staff"
	delivering clinical services
	"will continue to be employed by the PCT unless and until it decides otherwise."—[Official Report, 25 October 2005; Vol. 438, c. 152.]
	Our aim in making these changes is to benefit both patients and taxpayers. Fewer, more strategic PCTs will be better placed to ensure effective commissioning of services for patients, and to support the development of practice-based commissioning among GPs and other primary care staff. Patients will receive the right care and treatment in the right place, and at the right time. The taxpayer will see the release of £250 million worth of savings annually, through the merging of back-office functions and a reduction in administrative costs, for reinvestment in front-line services from 2008-09. That could pay, for example, for roughly 50,000 heart operations or major improvements in services for people with long-term conditions, especially older people. The changes will also build stronger partnerships between the NHS and local government.
	The reconfiguration of PCTs is the first stage in strengthening the commissioning function. The next stage is a development programme for all PCTs, which will ensure that they are strong, confident organisations fit for driving forward the NHS reforms that we are implementing.
	On ambulance trust reorganisation, in June 2005 the Government accepted the recommendations set out by Peter Bradley, our national ambulance adviser, in the review entitled "Taking Healthcare to the Patient: Transforming NHS Ambulance Services", which set out a vision for ambulance services. In future, they will provide more care in the home and more treatment at the scene, give better advice to patients over the telephone and ensure faster response times to save more lives. The review made it clear that in order to ensure that ambulance trusts have the right strategic capacity, infrastructure and staff to deliver these improvements in patient care, there should in future be fewer, larger ambulance trusts. These changes will enable standards within the new trusts to be levelled up to those of the best.
	In her written statement of 14 December 2005, my right hon. Friend the then Secretary of State set out our intention to consult and to ensure that the benefits outlined in the ambulance review can be fully realised. Following this consultation, the Secretary of State has now decided that from 1 July 2006, most of the existing 29 NHS ambulance trusts will merge into 12, with separate management arrangements for the Isle of Wight. For now, Staffordshire ambulance service will remain a separate trust, working in partnership with the new West Midlands ambulance service, but will eventually merge at a later date.
	Feedback from most areas was supportive of our proposals. However, we have decided to address the public's concern that local responsiveness and flexibility could be lost through having larger trusts by requiring ambulance trusts to ensure that their services are meeting the needs of all localities and populations within their boundaries. Those changes should mean more investment in front-line services as trusts identify savings in back-room functions; improved patient care through providing an opportunity to raise the standard of the service provided by all trusts to the level of the best; better emergency planning, with greater capacity and the capability to respond to major incidents of all kinds; more integrated services; and better career opportunities for
	staff.
	Changes of this kind are inevitably difficult. We have not sought to impose a single blueprint on the NHS; instead, we have listened carefully to representations from all Members and from local communities and organisations. Wherever possible, we have responded positively to them. We have one aim above all: to deliver better health care to patients. I commend this statement to the House.

Stephen O'Brien: Indeed, it does say it here, because that is what I wrote.
	First, let us look at ambulance trusts. Peter Bradley's review concluded that there should be fewer of them, but that they should be larger, yet no evidence for that major change was contained in the report, or made available since. Ministers then decided to reduce the number of strategic health authorities to align with their obsession with regions, notwithstanding the electorate's rejection of the idea in the north-east. With sleight of hand, Ministers have used the reorganisation as an excuse to reduce the number of trusts to 12, and then they have ducked the flak by suggesting that that was Peter Bradley's idea and recommendation all along. Will the Minister therefore undertake to place in the Library of the House any evidence that relates specifically to claims that creating large trusts will lead to improvements in patient care?
	How does the reorganisation achieve closer integration of all the emergency services? Will the Minister explain how a north-west regional ambulance service will integrate better with the newly merged Merseyside and Cheshire police force—a merger that will be carried out in the teeth of maximum hostility and objection? How will it integrate better with contingency planning in Cheshire, or with the Cheshire fire service's move to sub-regional control rooms?
	Will the Minister comment on proposals to reduce control room numbers by co-aligning them with the police and fire services? The House should bear it in mind that in Warwickshire, for example, the fire service responds to some 3,000 emergency calls a year, whereas the ambulance services respond to some 100,000.
	Who is co-ordinating the reorganisation across Government? Co-ordinated is the last thing that it is—perhaps the Deputy Prime Minister has been devoting his time to this matter recently. It is shambolic, inconsistent centralising by an arrogant Government who claim to listen but who choose not to hear the views of those who work on the front line and who know best.
	The official consultation on ambulance trusts lasted from the middle of September last year to near the end of March this year, yet the NHS appointments commission sent out letters on 30 January—in the middle of the consultation period—asking for nominations for men and women to chair the new NHS ambulance trusts. The question arises—was not the decision therefore a foregone conclusion?
	I have had a letter from Roger Moore, the chief executive of the appointments commission, in which he stated that the recruitment began
	"at the request of the Department of Health".
	I am pleased that concerted work by MPs across Staffordshire and by the shadow health team, supported by huge amounts of work by the people of the county, has caused Ministers to backtrack on axing Staffordshire ambulance service for up to two years. That 24-month period was set out in the handout on the Board in the Members' Lobby, but not in the statement. That is a classic fudge, as it puts Staffordshire ambulance trust in the departure lounge. However, will the Minister give the House an assurance that unless the west midlands service is brought up to the standard of Staffordshire there will be no hint of a merger, whether in two years or beyond?
	Given today's statement, any right-thinking person is entitled to regard the Government's consultation as a sham. Constant change will undermine what has already been achieved; for example, by turning round the East Anglian ambulance trust. The Buckinghamshire and Northamptonshire service is about to complete the process of splitting; now they will have to go through the upheaval of being merged again.
	We are not against the restructuring of PCTs per se—[Hon. Members: "Ah."] The Under-Secretary of State for Health, the hon. Member for Bury, South suggests that the whole statement was about PCTs; clearly he was not listening, as much of it dealt with ambulance trusts. On PCTs, as distinct from ambulance trusts, we are not opposed to restructuring, but we have always said that future functions need to be defined before such restructuring takes place.
	In 2002, the Department of Health abolished the 11 regional offices of the former NHS executive and about 100 health authorities. Today, the Government are bringing back that map. Has the Minister estimated the cost of that U-turn, which takes us back to the position four years ago? He may talk of the Secretary of State's clear commitment in October 2005 about the functions of PCTs, yet three months before that the DOH was equally clear, in "Commissioning a patient-led NHS", when it called for PCTs to become
	"patient-led and commissioning-led organisations with their role in provision reduced to a minimum"
	by 2008. The Secretary of State backtracked on that commitment, without reassessing whether the proposed structures would be fit for purpose. Now, no one is clear.
	As the Health Committee said in January, when it attacked the Government's indecision,
	"we are appalled at the continuing lack of clarity about whether or not PCTs will eventually divest themselves of provider functions."
	The Department of Health's NHS operating framework for 2006-07, published on 26 January, offered little further clarity, stating:
	"Where PCTs do continue to provide services, they will need to put in place clear governance procedures that ensure that there is no undue influence from the provider side on commissioning decisions."
	Will the Minister detail how 15 per cent. management cost savings can be made when the Government are calling for each PCT to have two sets of managers—one for commissioning and one for direct services?
	The problem for the Minister is that all this restructuring has gone on without putting in place the necessary precondition for its having a realistic chance of success: defining the future functions of PCTs. Will the Minister tell us how many PCTs are predicted to be direct providers of services in two years' time? New organisations can hardly be expected to deliver unless and until they have clarity of purpose.
	In his statement the Minister said that in some cases the new proposals differ from those suggested by the strategic health authorities and the external panel. Will he tell the House how many PCTs the expert panel proposed should be created overall; and will he publish in full the panel's advice so that we can see to what extent the Government arrived at different decisions and the implications of the variations?
	The Government seem only now to be waking up to the cost of the reconfiguration and the redundancies that go with it. Can the Minister confirm that the estimated cost of this latest round of NHS reconfiguration, which will merely take us back to where we were four years ago, will be £320 million? Will he also confirm that at £250 million—the figure he gave in his statement—the savings will be less than the cost? Is he confident even of that amount, or was the Health Committee right when it said that savings of between £60 million and £135 million were nearer the mark? Are those estimates gross or net, given the cost of the redundancies that will be inevitable to deliver on that Government promise?
	What is the time scale? The House is entitled to have that crucial information in a year when the Government's financial control of, and credibility with, the NHS is shot to pieces and the NHS is in confusion and plunged into at least 10 months of uncertainty and chaos at PCT level. This is no way to run an NHS.

Andy Burnham: Thank you, Mr. Speaker, and in that long speech, I will seek to pick out the points of substance that there were.
	There is no confusion. Our aim overall is to improve patient care. That is what we are in business to do, and I can tell the hon. Gentleman without fear of contradiction that patient care is improving. Patients are not waiting for more than six months for in-patient treatment. On the whole, they wait a maximum of 13 weeks for an out-patient appointment. There is clear evidence of progress. That is what guides our changes; it is what guides these changes, so I can assure him that there is no confusion on our part at least.
	The hon. Gentleman says that this is change for change's sake. I point out to him that the NHS changes; it is different from what it was in 2000. We have an ambitious programme of reform to drive through in the NHS. We want to ensure that people can choose where they are treated and that the wait for that treatment is short, once the full reform programme is introduced. That will require strong commissioning throughout the NHS. It will require people cleverly commissioning services and using their organisational strength. That is why we are making these changes. He will know that some changes have begun, and some of the changes that we have formalised today have already begun to take shape.
	On ambulance trusts, the hon. Gentleman claims that we have an obsession with the regions—far from it. He asks what the connection is with other emergency services. Surely, it makes sense to ensure that, at regional level, there is the contingency capacity to deal with major events and that capacity is planned regionally. I hope that he agrees that there is some logic in doing that. He claims that there is no support, but Peter Bradley's proposals commanded strong support from within the ambulance service, particularly because they clearly focused on the professional development of those who work in the service, thus giving them the ability to shape ambulance services in future.
	The hon. Gentleman claims that we have not listened. Clearly, if he looks at the proposals for PCTs that we are publishing today, he will see that precisely the opposite is the case. We have indeed listened hon. Members—not just Labour Members, but Opposition Members, too—and we have taken on board those concerns. He asks where the proposals differ and whether we will put the evidence in the Library. I would be happy to do that, but the reason why we have taken those decisions and listened to those representations from hon. Members on both sides of the House is that we want a consensus of support for the new organisation, because it is our judgment that the organisation will have the best chance of success if it is underpinned by strong community support. That is exactly why we have done that.
	The hon. Gentleman asks me whether we will detail where the cost savings can be made. There will be one-off costs in relation to the exercise, but the savings will come year on year. As for the timetable, we expect that the savings from the exercise—some £250 million a year—will be realised by 2008. That, of course, will be a recurrent saving for front-line services.
	There is a logic and coherence to our proposals, and the hon. Gentleman talks of incoherence and confusion among Government Members. I put it to him that the Conservative party's policy at the last general election was to take about £650 million from so-called NHS bureaucracy, as defined by the James review; coupled with that was the patient's passport, which would have taken money from the health service. What kind of organisational chaos would the combination of those policies have created?

Andy Burnham: I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's warm welcome for the proposal. I hope that we will not see the emergence of an east-west Cheshire split and an explanation of the different cultures between the two. I am grateful for his recognition that we have listened and created a structure with which he is comfortable. Under the new north-west ambulance service, which will serve my constituency, too, it will obviously be crucial that performance is improved across the piece. When improvements need to be made to services, it is important that the body takes particular care to bear down on the problems and ensures that all residents of the north-west can look forward to and enjoy the same standards of service. I am sure that the new service will be focused on those matters.

Andy Burnham: I would make a stanch defence of targets. By providing clarity from the centre, we have been able to deliver improvements to the NHS in recent years, so I make no apology for them. However, the hon. Gentleman will know that we have reduced the number of targets and have set fewer priorities, as we need to focus on our true priorities. It is the new PCTs' job to ensure delivery of standards. Throughout the process, I am pleased that there has been continued improvement in NHS patient care, and I fully expect the new organisational structure to continue to drive change for patients' benefit.

Andy Burnham: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his two cheers. Again, I will pass them on to others who have worked on this. The crucial test in judging changes to an ambulance service is, first, that the service is viable and, secondly, that it is providing a safe service to all the residents in the area. Those are the guiding principles on which any further changes will be made. As I said to the hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack), any further change would be about ensuring that service standards could be further improved. We recognise the improvements in service standards that Staffordshire has reached; that is why we are happy to make the decisions that we announced. I hear what my hon. Friend has said. In going forward with any further change, we must be clear that it is about improving service standards to all the residents of Staffordshire and the west midlands.

Stephen Dorrell: Can the Minister confirm that the effect of his announcement is that in future commissioning in the health service will be the responsibility of roughly the same number of regional health authorities that the Government inherited in 1997 and renamed strategic health authorities, of roughly the same number of health authorities that the Government inherited in 1997 and renamed primary care trusts, or importantly—in this I agree with the Government—when in the hands of GP fundholders renamed primary care commissioners? Does this mean that we got it roughly right?

HOUSING AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT (WATER SUPPLY ASSESSMENT)

John Gummer: I beg to move,
	That leave be given to bring in a Bill to require an assessment to be made, before construction, of the water supply requirements resulting from housing and commercial development.
	The House has not yet created a mechanism for declaring a non-interest. However, I should like to make such a declaration. As the chairman of a water company, I ought not to be keen on restricting the amount of water that can be sold. As we have seen from today's newspaper headlines, however, we are facing a serious water shortage arising from a wide range of reasons. Because of global warming, our precipitation level is now lower, and the precipitation arrives in much more concentrated amounts. It therefore runs off the land into the rivers and out to sea much more quickly than before.
	There is no doubt that we face real difficulties relating to our water supply. This comes as a surprise to people abroad, who think of Britain as a nation in which water is ever-present. I was in Paris on Monday, and a senior official there commented that he was now convinced about global warming largely because it appeared that it no longer rained in Britain. That might be an unusual, French way of looking at the issue, but it underlines the seriousness of the situation.
	This is not a party political comment, but I was surprised to discover that there is no statutory reason why anyone building an estate or a commercial building, for example, should ascertain in advance that the water supply and sewerage infrastructure for the site will be adequate. He will want to know that connection is possible, but he does not need to ascertain whether the system will bear the additional weight of his development.
	The Government are proposing to bring 750,000 more people into the Thames Gateway, yet, as far as I can discover, they have made no direct assessment of the ability to provide either a water supply or sewerage facilities for those new homes. Let us take the town of Ashford as a further example. At first, it was proposed to build a significant number of new houses there. Only when the local authority was able to prove that neither the water supply nor the sewerage infrastructure would be adequate was that number cut very substantially. Throughout the country, development goes ahead without those fundamental questions being asked.
	When introducing the sustainable communities document, the Government failed to discuss water at all with anyone. Several years of consideration of that document had taken place before formal discussions were conducted with Water UK or anyone else. That shows how unimportant water has been either in the psyche of the nation or in the Government's understanding.
	It is interesting that Members of all parties represented in the House are among the supporters of this ten-minute Bill, including nationalist, Liberal, Conservative and Labour Members. Among them are those who hold shadow responsibility and who have until recently held Government responsibility for environmental matters. One of the reasons for that is the divorce between what was the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and is now the Department for Communities and Local Government—I am one of the few who can remember that distinction—and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Since the sidelining of DEFRA, so that it no longer has a direct influence and control over these matters, issues such as water have become much less important than the aggrandisement of what was the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
	I want to make sure that the seriousness of the current situation is brought home to the nation. To build without being able to provide water or sewerage facilities, often in areas that will also be plagued by flooding, is sheer folly. One of the things that many of our constituents do not understand is that we can have both drought and floods in the present circumstances. We can have a shortage of water and yet be plagued by a damaging excess of it. We must therefore start—and continue with retrofitting—with the new homes, office and factories being built. Unless we ask the fundamental questions, which the Bill seeks to ensure that we do, we shall not get the right answers. If we do not ask whether there is enough water for such homes, we only have ourselves to blame when such homes get constricted because of drought and water scarcity regulations.
	Of course, that would entail an important role for the water company and the Environment Agency, which would together produce that assessment. If a water company says that it can provide water for a new development, that gives the owner of a new house or commercial premises a clear, bankable indication that he can carry on his home or commercial life without interruption. The fact that the Environment Agency will have to support that will ensure that there is a proper implied contract for the owner of a new home or commercial premises. At the moment, the day after a family moves into a new home, the local water company can say, "Frightfully sorry, but we haven't got enough water for you." I hope that that does hot happen, but the situation is becoming increasingly sharp and difficult.
	It is not possible to overestimate the state of our water supplies. Three local water companies are considering or asking for planning permission for desalination plants—in this country, Britain—which we thought were an unfortunate necessity in the middle east and beyond. That is one of the immediate effects of climate change. Given the inadequacy of the Government's response to climate change, that will get worse, not better. Unless we take these practical, simple measures to ensure that such matters are highlighted, we will not be able to defend future generations from a water shortage that will leave them in a position that we never thought would be experienced in Britain in 100 years. Standpipes for much of the south and centre of Britain are something that we did not expect to see at all, yet we are proposing to inject into the area where standpipes are being threatened yet more housing, to the tune of up to 4 million homes.

[Relevant documents: First Special Report from the Regulatory Reform Committee, Session 2005-06,Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill, HC 878.Second Special Report from the Regulatory Reform Committee, Session 2005-06,Government's Response to the First Special Report on the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill, HC 1004.First Report from the Procedure Committee, Session 2005-06, Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill, HC 894. Seventeenth Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Session 2005-06, Legislative Scrutiny: Eighth Progress Report, HC 1062.Third Report from the Public Administration Select Committee, Session 2005-06,Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill, HC 1033.]
	As amended in the Standing Committee, further considered.

New Clause 2
	 — 
	REPORT ON OPERATION OF ACT

Mark Harper: New clause 2 aims to inject a shot of transparency into the Bill. It provides for a report on the operation of the Act. It follows recommendation 2 of the Regulatory Reform Committee's report on the Bill, which stated
	"We reaffirm the recommendation of our predecessor Committee that Departments should be assessed on their progress in removing unnecessary regulations and controls and not simply on their progress in simplifying measures. We recommend accordingly."
	Transparency is something on which we all agree. Allowing the greatest possible visibility for a process encourages good government and sound decision-making; allowing decisions to be made behind closed doors in Whitehall has the potential, as we all know, to have the opposite effect. Deregulation and better regulation are such important agendas that we must shine the light of scrutiny into the dark recesses of departmental decision-making.
	In the Committee debates, in which I participated, the Minister was very proud of the Government's agenda. He said on 2 March:
	"As a Government, we have committed ourselves to one of the most radical regulatory reform packages anywhere in the world".—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, 2 March 2006; c. 125.]
	and he specifically talked about the culture change that he wished to inculcate in Whitehall. It seems to me that the best way of doing that is to ensure that as much light as possible is shone on the measures in the Act in respect of reducing regulations and burdens on business.
	The Regulatory Reform Committee suggested that one of the key reasons why the regulatory reform orders introduced under the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 had been far from successful was because of the lack of political will within Whitehall. The Committee claimed that low political importance was attached by Ministers and civil servants to propose areas ripe for regulatory reform as compared with bringing new legislation before the House. As the Minister acknowledged in Committee, a culture change in Whitehall is necessary and it should not be viewed as preferable for civil servants and Ministers to pin their careers on creating regulations and legislation rather than tidying up existing rules and scrapping obsolete or disproportionate burdens. Indeed, the latter is of far greater benefit to business than the former.
	The new clause would help to bring about the necessary culture change. It would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report and lay it before Parliament, which would provide the opportunity for the House to debate what Ministers would view as the Government's success in reducing burdens. The report would detail what orders had been made and to what effect; what burdens had been removed, what simplified and what other progress had been made. The Government would therefore have to set out in stark detail exactly how deregulatory or regulatory it has been. That should provide a strong incentive for Ministers to encourage and prioritise measures that deregulate and reduce burdens on business, rather than the opposite, which seems the case at the moment.
	I shall deal now with new clauses 7 and 24. New clause 7 is effectively a sunset clause, which suggests sunsetting the Bill after five years. We make too little use of post-legislative scrutiny in the House and in this country, although we are getting better at employing pre-legislative scrutiny. The new clause would represent an important step forward in allowing Parliament and interest groups to input into legislation before it is finalised. We do not do enough to monitor the effectiveness of laws after they are on the statute book. A sunset clause is one form of post-legislative scrutiny; it is clearly not desirable for all legislation to include it because the increased work load on Parliament would be prohibitive. In certain cases, however, there is a clear argument for having sunset clauses, particularly for important and controversial legislation. Control orders immediately spring to mind. Sunset clauses can allow Parliament to look again at legislation and see if it wants to bring it back into force.
	As an alternative, new clause 24 is not a sunset clause, but a renewal clause, providing a separate option for increasing post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill and the Government may find it more amenable. Under the new clause, part 1 of the Bill, the most important part, must be brought before Parliament for reapproval or rejection at least every two years.

David Heath: May I set at rest the mind of the hon. Member for Forest of Dean (Mr. Harper)? I am quite sure that I speak for my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) when I say that his earlier comment was a compliment, rather than an attempt to deprecate the hon. Gentleman's absence. We genuinely missed the hon. Gentleman, who made a valuable contribution in Committee and has made another one today in introducing these new clauses, dealing as they do with transparency and openness. They also make an at least crude attempt to apply a degree of post-legislative scrutiny to this part of the Bill.
	In the spirit of openness and transparency, I would have liked to have had a letter in similar terms to the letter referred to earlier by the hon. Member for Christchurch (Mr. Chope). I am little surprised to learn that Liberal Democrat Front Benchers were not accorded that courtesy on this occasion; perhaps the letter is somewhere in transmission at this very moment. One would usually expect to be copied into correspondence dealing with the substance of a Bill.
	As the hon. Member for Forest of Dean correctly said, new clause 2 requires that a report be made by the Secretary of State on the Bill's operation. Previous deregulatory legislation—indeed, all sorts of legislation—has not lived up to its expectations. For instance, one of my continuing criticisms is the raft of Home Office legislation, to which I referred in yesterday's debate. Large parts of it were described as urgent matters that needed the House's attention and which were absolutely crucial to the well-being and safety of the population—however, years later they still have not been implemented. If such provisions are urgently needed and vital to public safety, one has to ask why they have not been implemented.
	Similarly, in dealing with this legislation we are entitled to ask, after a period, what the Government have done with this power. Have they used it effectively? Do we have a programme of deregulation, or is the power being used in abeyance as a reserve power—as with the change to Standing Orders in order to implement Law Commission reports, to which reference was made yesterday—rather than to achieve the objectives that we and the Government share? I therefore think that new clause 2 has a great deal to commend it.
	I come now to the issue of sunset clauses. In his intervention, my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge was right to distinguish between the powers that lapse as a result of a sunset clause and the orders introduced under those powers. If the Bill becomes an Act, Ministers may be tempted to argue against its renewal on the ground that we would thus be left defenceless against overburdensome legislation and regulation. However, that argument would be spurious, as there is nothing in this and other new clauses in the group that would cause the regulations or the deregulation made under the powers contained in the Bill to be annulled. They would merely enable the House to consider whether assurances given by the Government during the Bill's passage had been implemented in practice. They would allow us to determine whether promises had been kept and the Bill's purposes adhered to, and to ascertain whether we had the sort of deregulatory programme and the lack of excess that the Government have assured us all along was their intention.
	That is a modest ambition. In one way, it might be a desirable concept to sunset all regulations from their origin, but that might run the risk of causing administrative chaos. We understand the complexity of the drafting required to produce a satisfactory response, but the lapsing of a power would not create immediate difficulties. The new clause means that the Government would be required to come back to the House and say to hon. Members, "This is how we have used this power. You have seen it in action, and will understand that it was used entirely properly and for its intended purpose. It has worked well, and we ask the House to renew it." Alternatively, the House could say to the Government, "You told us that you would use the power for one purpose, but in fact you have used it for quite another" or, "You told us this power was needed urgently, yet you have not used it at all." The new clause would enable the House to have control of what the Executive want to do.
	I would always argue that the legislature should have control of what the Executive do, especially in respect of the procedures of this House. More than anything else, the Bill is about those procedures. It is therefore entirely appropriate for Parliament to decide whether a power is working satisfactorily, and I am happy to lend my support to the suggestions made by the hon. Member for Forest of Dean.

Patrick McFadden: Some people who have examined the procedure that will emerge when the Bill is enacted do not think that it will be an easier process than primary legislation. It might be a more appropriate procedure on occasions. There may well be more consultation and debate on, and scrutiny of, some regulatory reform orders than would be the case for individual clauses in primary legislation, so we should not be prescriptive.
	In Committee, the former Minister spoke of the need for a culture change across government. The approach that we need to take is one of partnership, with regulators and the regulated working together. What message would we be sending the business community, charities, the voluntary sector and public sector organisations affected by the Bill if we said that the deregulation scheme that it created would be killed off automatically after five years? I return again to the comment made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston about the pressures on Departments. Departments will be less likely to invest a ot of resources in pursuing reforms if they might not prove possible in the end. The culture change that we want should offer certainty about, and confidence in, methods of delivery.
	People should be able to rely on primary legislation. They should know that if the Bill is passed, it is there to last. We want to avoid a situation in which those who are regulated by an order do not have confidence in its provisions. I hope that the orders will deliver wide-ranging reforms, as has already happened under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.

Andrew Love: I was a little disappointed by the Minister's comments on new clause 2. As I said, although I do not propose to support it, because its terms are too prescriptive, there is considerable merit in the recommendation by the Select Committee on Regulatory Reform for regular parliamentary scrutiny of what the Bill achieves.
	I have two major reasons for thinking that. They are based on experience. First, I served on the Select Committee for about two to two and half years, although it felt a great deal longer. One of the things that would have made our work much more effective was greater transparency with regard to the lack of political will in Departments to achieve the objectives set out in legislation.
	There is no doubt that one way to gain the attention of politicians and civil servants is to have transparency and a regular report to Parliament that allows us, the media and the public to know what is going on. That is important because deregulation has become a much higher political priority for everyone. We are constantly chided by the Opposition for our failures in deregulation, and we continually make commitments to do better. Looking back at the historical record, it is clear that previous Governments have not done that well, either; we all remember the "bonfire of the regulations" in the early 1990s. It behoves all of us in Parliament to create the conditions whereby we can succeed. The Bill does many things, but it does not achieve proper parliamentary scrutiny—I am talking about scrutiny in this Chamber—of what is being achieved.
	The second consideration, as I said in an intervention, is the culture of Whitehall. It is undoubtedly the case that the priority both for politicians and for civil servants is creating new regulations and new laws. One becomes a Cabinet Minister by passing laws; one becomes a permanent secretary by assisting Ministers in passing laws. We need to try to create incentives to do away with laws as well as to create them. This measure is a small mechanism, but it is probably the only way in which we can change the culture of Whitehall and create a better opportunity to do away with regulation.

New Clause 5
	 — 
	DELAY IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 13

Jonathan Djanogly: This important group of amendments seeks to introduce similar changes to clauses 14, 15 and 16, which outline the procedure that would apply when an order is to be made under the negative resolution procedure, the affirmative resolution procedure or the super-affirmative resolution procedure. One of our long-held criticisms of the Bill is that it lacks adequate safeguards for the use of its fast-track order-making powers, which many people believe will abolish our constitutional longstops. The Bill has widely become known as the "abolition of Parliament Bill".
	We supported the Government's amendments to part 1 of the Bill yesterday, following their stated intention that the Bill would deal only with deregulation. However, we made it clear that our overall support would depend on the introduction of further safeguards. The introduction of a procedural veto to the Bill, which would be exercised either by the Houses of Parliament or by Select Committees, was one of the primary mechanisms recommended by my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) and me on Second Reading, as a means of introducing such safeguards.
	For that reason, an amendment to clause 16 was tabled in Committee. It would have required an order to have been withdrawn or amended if an amendment to the order had been agreed by one or both of the Houses of Parliament or by the relevant Committees of either House. The amendment would have granted Parliament the power to insist on amendments to the order which, if not accepted by the Minister, would have to be withdrawn. The Minister would then have to start the process all over again.
	The Conservatives were, admittedly, far from being the only ones calling for a parliamentary veto on the use of the procedures in the Bill. The Liberal Democrats have done the same, and I noted with interest the reports of the Regulatory Reform and Public Administration Committees, among whose recommendations was a call for an amendment to the Bill to provide scope for an effective veto.
	Our support for the insertion of the procedural veto into the Bill meant that we welcomed the then Minister's announcement in Committee—I see him in his place today—that he would introduce a parliamentary veto on the use of the procedure. The Conservative party welcomes the Government's amendments on the statutory veto as a significant step in the right direction. It is accepted in most quarters that the Bill requires adequate safeguards so that it is not used in future as a tool for the Executive to abuse its power and discard Parliament. The amendments are meant to carry through the Government's pledge to build in a veto over an order for the relevant Committees of both Houses of Parliament. However, the amendments fall far short of introducing the robust and firm veto that we would expect to see inserted in such an important and constitutionally significant Bill.
	Our concerns were heightened when we read the wording of the amendments. The Minister needs to explain exactly what the amendments entail. A Select Committee of either House may recommend that the relevant draft order should not be proceeded with. That recommendation, however, can be discarded if it is rejected by a resolution of the relevant House. Furthermore, when making such a recommendation, the Committee must have considered a range of factors, including those listed in clause 3. Our primary concern is that the conditions imposed on the relevant Committee, by which it is able to exercise such a veto, are excessive.
	The primary difference between the Government's amendments and the amendment tabled by Conservative Members in Committee and now in new clause 5 is that the Government's proposals allow for the veto to be exercised only by a Select Committee, whereas our proposals allow for a veto by either the Committee or the Houses of Parliament. I note that the Procedure Committee, which recently produced an insightful report on the Bill, recommended that the power of veto should be exercised
	"outside the Committee as well as within it".
	While the Government's amendments allow both Houses to become involved in the process, they do not contain an automatic right of veto. If either House is unhappy with an order, it cannot veto it until a Committee has acted. The Procedure Committee's report noted that there was no need for the Bill to include a power of veto exercised beyond the Committee. It recommended that the mechanism by which the House of Commons exercised the veto should rest on House of Commons procedure. Is the Government's failure to empower Parliament by including an automatic veto in the Bill a result of that recommendation? If so, what steps will be taken to amend the House's procedure to ensure that it possesses a veto and that the mechanics are fully in place? More urgently, why will the Government not accept that this is a matter of great concern to Opposition parties and other Members who have voiced concerns and deal with the matter now, setting out the balances and stating the powers in the Bill?
	While the Opposition are concerned about the lack of a parliamentary veto under the Government's amendments, we are also concerned that a Committee could have its veto overridden by a resolution of the relevant House. According to the wording of the Government's amendments, the veto of a Select Committee, which the Cabinet Office proudly proclaimed in its press release on 4 May, is effectively nothing more than a recommendation. The difference between a veto and a recommendation is obvious and needs no further explanation. Were a Commons Committee to recommend that no further proceedings were to take place, is it not likely that the Government would simply use their majority in the House to overrule it? Would not that negate completely the introduction of the veto?
	If the Government have their way on this set of provisions, how will Parliament be able to ensure that the more contentious issues are dealt with in the Lords, where the veto is not capable of being vetoed by majority party votes?

Greg Knight: The Government deserve credit for listening to representations and giving ground in some other areas, but does my hon. Friend accept that in this area they have failed to meet the assurances given by the previous Minister, the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr. Murphy), to the Procedure Committee? Is he aware that on 7 February this year, told the Procedure Committee:
	"so our commitment is very clear, that we will not seek to do anything which is highly controversial. The Select Committee will make a judgment on that and the Select Committee can veto any recommendation from a minister."
	The veto now proposed falls far short of that commitment.

Kenneth Clarke: My hon. Friend is making sound points in criticising the adequacy of the veto offered. Will he reflect on whether a veto is totally reassuring? As my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire (Mr. Knight) just pointed out, the former Minister repeatedly gave assurances in various forums that nothing that was controversial would be taken through in this way. I take that to mean that a substantial number of Members of the House saying that a measure should be subject to the parliamentary process should be adequate to stop the procedure being used. If all that is offered can simply be overridden by the working majority of the Government of the day, very controversial measures could be taken through using this simple, scarcely parliamentary procedure. Just a bare majority of Members of the House of Commons would make sure that an unsuitable process was used to override a significant section of public and parliamentary opinion.

David Heath: Actually, what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said was entirely in line with the new clause that we shall discuss in this group, which my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) and I tabled and which I believe the hon. Gentleman has set his mind against. It is no good him saying that his right hon. and learned Friend has made an important point if he disagrees with the fundamentals of it when it comes to a vote.

Jonathan Djanogly: I think that the matter should be seen in a wider context, and in that context I cannot answer my hon. Friend's question. What I can say is that our party will discuss it with our noble Friends.
	Another of our concerns is that the amendments severely restrict the period during which the Committee's veto can be exercised. Amendments Nos. 46 and 50 allow for the exercise of the veto in the negative and affirmative resolution procedure respectively only after a 30-day period commencing with the day on which the draft order is laid before Parliament. That means that the period during which the veto may be exercised is limited to just 10 days.
	While I understand the time limit, I wonder on reflection whether there is really a need to prevent a Committee from exercising its veto in the first 30 days following the laying of a draft order before Parliament. Perhaps the Minister could explain. In any event, we look forward to hearing the debate on the issue, particularly the debate on amendment (a), which was tabled by members of the Procedure Committee.
	Amendments Nos. 54 and 55 allow for the veto to be exercised under the super-affirmative procedure only during the period between the moment when the Minister lays a statement before Parliament detailing representations made on the draft order and the moment at which the order is voted on in both Houses and therefore approved. It is unclear how long the gap between the two events is estimated to be. Is it not feasible that they could occur within a matter of days of each other?
	We are also concerned about the conditions that must be met for a recommendation from a Committee to be valid. They appear onerous, and may provide the Government with a simple excuse to reject a Committee's recommendation rather than resorting to an attempt to defeat the recommendation in the House.
	The factors listed in clause 3 that a Minister must take into account when introducing an order are essential. They provide a valuable safeguard, one of the few originally contained in the Bill before widespread criticisms forced the Government to back down. For that reason it is right that the Minister must consider those factors, but is it necessary for a parliamentary Committee—consisting, I am sure, of competent and respected parliamentarians—to have to take account of the same factors and more?
	The changes to the Bill announced recently by the Cabinet Office are vital from a constitutional viewpoint. They will help to prevent a Government from abusing the Bill and from being able to amend any legislation on the statute book, but imposing conditions on a Committee of Parliament that is carrying out its function of holding the Executive to account and preventing abuses of power is surely unnecessary and over-restrictive. Do the Government not consider a parliamentary Committee sufficiently responsible to make a wise enough decision on a draft order introduced under the Bill? For that reason we tabled amendment (b) to the Government's amendments Nos. 50, 54 and 55, calling for the removal of subsections (2B), (4B) and (6B). We believe that such changes would create the robust and flexible veto that so many constitutional experts believe is vital to ensuring that the Executive do not abuse the power conferred on them by the Bill.
	Our concerns about the Government amendments appear to be shared by the Procedure Committee. I note that it has also tabled amendments to all the Government's amendments relating to the statutory veto, calling for the omission from amendment No. 46 of proposed new subsections (2B) and (2C) and the corresponding subsections in amendments Nos. 50, 54 and 55. They would allow a Committee of either House to recommend that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the draft order. There would be no factors to consider and the onerous conditions imposed on the Committee by the Government amendments would cease to exist.
	I shall now discuss our further amendments to the Government amendments, which would prevent a Minister from tabling a draft order for a period of two years if the same or similar order had been vetoed by the relevant Select Committee. A two-year moratorium has been imposed on altering the regulatory reform order, but no such standstill period is contained in the proposals. I noted with interest that such a moratorium was also recommended in the Regulatory Reform Committee's report. It was aimed at preventing a Minister who has just had an order vetoed from laying a similar order before Parliament.
	In recent years, we have seen a growing culture in which the Executive ignore the will of Parliament or, should I say, the people. Certainly, we see that happening in the European Union with underhand plans, now being implemented, to bring in by stealth elements of the failed constitution. In the UK, we see it in the Government bringing in their regionalisation plans—whether it be through primary care trust mergers, about which we heard earlier today, or in respect of the police—despite losing heavily in the north-east referendum. Our amendments are aimed at stopping that move towards legislation by stealth and regurgitation of failed plans.
	An important point about the statutory veto concerns the make-up of the Committee of either House charged with reporting on the draft order. It is unclear in the Bill what type of Committee it should be. Is there to be a permanent Committee, charged with reviewing all orders issued under the Bill? If so, I draw the Minister's attention to the Procedure Committee's conclusion that parliamentary scrutiny of draft orders should not necessarily be in the hands of a single Committee responsible for all orders, as in the Bill, but be discharged by whatever Committee has the relevant subject expertise, including the departmental Select Committee. Will the Minister clarify which Committees the Government envisage undertaking those crucial roles?
	The Conservative party believes that the exercise of this veto, which was a central plank in the Government's effort to placate the fears of opponents of the Bill and was recommended by both the Public Administration Committee and the Regulatory Reform Committee, should be far more flexible than is envisaged in the amendment. The opinion of a Select Committee charged with reporting on a draft order laid before Parliament under the Bill should carry more force. The should be a less restrictive time period for the exercise of the Committee's recommendation, and fewer conditions should be imposed on the exercise of that recommendation.

Andrew Miller: I have some sympathy with the point that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is making, but I am simply trying to find a practical way forward. We have yet to hear the Minister's views on this issue, but I am sure that the House will agree that the restating of the undertaking to which I have referred would be more than a nuance and would shift the ground, albeit slightly.

Greg Knight: Surely the point is this. We were given a ministerial undertaking on 7 February and what we need now is not a second one, but the delivery of the first. That can be done today if the Minister accepts the Procedure Committee's amendments.

Andrew Miller: The hon. Gentleman must not tempt me. The alternative to that is that practical politics might stop a proposal returning to the House within the lifetime of a Parliament.
	These are probing amendments, designed to elicit an explanation from the Government of when it would be sensible, in the lifetime of a Parliament, for a Minister to bring back to the House an order that a Select Committee had decided was not suitable for regulatory reform. Under what circumstances would the Minister consider that appropriate?
	I am trying to break these complex legal issues into simple and practical procedures that would allow hon. Members to do our job and examine the work of the Executive in an effective manner. The work of the Regulatory Reform Committee would be strengthened if Conservative Members bothered to turn up, as I noted previously to the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly), but that is a matter for him to deal with.
	An effective mechanism is in place, but we are trying to make it stronger so that it can deal with the enhanced powers set out in the Bill. I hope that my comments will inform that debate, and I look forward to the response from my hon. Friend the Minister. That, in turn, will help the House to determine the best way forward.

David Heath: I am intrigued by the notion expounded by the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Andrew Miller) that ridiculing Ministers causes them to be sacked. In my experience, they get promoted or retain their salaries when their jobs are taken away. However, he clearly knows more about that than I.
	We are dealing with one of the three most important elements in the Bill. Yesterday, I set out the three ways to secure some safety with the proposals. I said that that could be done by prescription of what could be dealt with by the Bill, by proscription of what could not be so dealt with, and by protection—that is, using the safeguards available to the House to influence the use of procedure.
	This group of amendments is entitled "Parliamentary veto", but that is an unfortunate misnomer. A better alternative might be "Parliamentary caveat", as we are certainly not talking about Parliament vetoing what the Government propose. We have heard a great deal about the value of ministerial assurances and a Select Committee of the House was assured, right at the start of our consideration of the Bill, that there would be a Select Committee veto on proposals. The former Minister, who is now Minister for Employment and Welfare Reform, originally thought that that mechanism was already in the Bill. It was gently pointed out to him that that was not the case, but he seemed to retain that misapprehension even as the Committee stage began. Eventually, he promised that it would be brought in later.
	The tenor of the Government's response to the quite proper criticism of the Bill voiced by hon. Members of all parties has been that the Select Committee structure would have primacy in the procedural arrangements. It therefore bodes very badly for the exercise of the powers in the Bill that Ministers are not prepared, even now, to accept the recommendations of the Procedure Committee or of the Regulatory Reform Committee. The members of those Committees have great knowledge of these matters, but their proposals were not adopted by Ministers when they put forward their amendments.

Tony Wright: There is, of course, a slight gap between the way in which we talk about Parliament and how it operates, and perhaps we ought to confess to that, in the interests of people who listen to our debates and read the reports of them. That was caught quite nicely by the casual remark of my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Andrew Miller), the Chairman of the Regulatory Reform Committee, when he said as an aside that the Conservative members of that Committee do not turn up. I do not say that to make a trivial party point of the kind that we are prone to make; I say it only because we are talking about the great powers that should live within our Select Committees and how important it is that their will should prevail, and we then go on to talk about the glories of Parliament itself. Yet that is suddenly pierced when we see the reality of how such things work.
	It is rather amusing in a way to watch the Opposition parties failing to agree on what would be appropriate for Parliament to do in the circumstances—whether it is better that a Committee should decide, whether the whole House should decide, or whether a percentage of the House should decide, all of which ideas depend on different versions of what Parliament is and how it operates. However, it is quite a perverse argument to suggest that the House itself should not decide on a matter before it. That argument is being put, because the House is governed by parties and inbuilt majorities. That is true; it is how our system works—but it is odd to pick away at that system in one little segment without acknowledging the fact in our wider deliberations.
	That is a curious proposition, because anyone looking at it from the outside would think it a rather sensible procedure for the whole House—the Commons bit of parliamentary sovereignty—to exercise its power, so that it can constitutionally trump whatever a part of the House might decide. That would seem the constitutionally proper arrangement. Indeed, that is precisely how we proceed in the entirety of our business. To acknowledge publicly that we do not want to proceed in that way, as is being argued, is to give the game away, in a sense, about how this place operates. If we are going to do that, we should at least follow the argument through and give the whole game away, and not pretend that we can just give a little bit of it away.
	I take this area of the Bill and the amendments seriously. They are crucial. As the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) just said, we are talking about one of the most objectionable bits of the first incarnation of the Bill. It was right to say that it would become less objectionable, or unobjectionable, only if an effective veto were put into the Bill to provide a mechanism to enable us to say, "It is not appropriate to use this mechanism for this purpose," and for that view to prevail.
	The question is: have the Government have inserted such a mechanism? The answer is: partly. We have, perhaps, a qualified veto. We have a recommendation power. However, if it is a veto, it could be argued that we have a provision to veto the veto. Then we are back to the arguments that I have just described about how Parliament works. Parliament can collectively decide what to do—but we know that in reality, that can subvert the mechanism that we think we have established to do a job for us. As has been said, we are talking about a Committee that has a Government majority anyway, so why do the Government need the reassurance of a veto on the veto when they have inserted a procedure that, on the whole, is thought to be satisfactory?
	There may be disagreements about the mechanisms being recommended, but what unites everybody who is contributing to this discussion is the proposition that we want a strong rather than a weak veto. We want an effective veto, rather than an ineffective one. We are entitled to look to the Government to provide assurances about what is going to happen in the days to come to deliver that effective veto, so that this whole area of concern about the Bill is comprehensively removed. That is my main point.
	I have one further point on a matter that has been raised already—trying to specify the grounds on which the qualified veto can be exercised by a Committee. Government amendments Nos. 46, 50, 54 and 55 insert that qualified veto, but they also set out the only grounds that a Committee may properly take into account when deciding whether to exercise that veto. Including in the Bill in that way the grounds on which a Committee may make a decision is entirely new. Previously, that has always been a matter for Standing Orders.
	There are two difficult alternatives: either the courts will have the power to review proceedings in Parliament, or the limitation is entirely ineffective because the courts would hold that power without an express provision overriding article 9 of the Bill of Rights. They have no power to examine a Committee's reasoning, because to do so would be to "impeach or question" proceedings in Parliament. It is constitutionally extremely peculiar to invite the courts to review judicially the validity of parliamentary decisions. That is why a number of the amendments—including one tabled by me—seek to remove those parts of the veto provision.
	I hope that when he replies, the Minister will assure us that the concerns being expressed about the effectiveness of the veto will be addressed, and that he will reflect further and deliver a veto that will be strong rather than weak, and effective rather than ineffective. I hope that he will reconsider whether it is necessary, or indeed constitutionally desirable or possible, to specify the grounds on which a Committee of the House can exercise its power.

Kenneth Clarke: I welcome the Minister to her new task. She is doing her best, with all these concessions, to sort out a rather miserable process that she inherited. I acknowledge all that. However, my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire precisely and brilliantly responded to her main point. The undertakings were given by a Minister who said that the Bill would be used for only narrow purposes. I shall not go back to yesterday's debate, but I do not believe that the Bill as it stands has narrowed the scope of the powers to the scope described by the former Minister. It allows for far more than ordinary deregulation. That must be looked at again.
	I hope lots of the orders go through. I hope the Government make liberal use of their new process. I undertake not to vote in deferred Divisions for trivial reasons to block deregulatory measures and upset the Government's timetable, or to cause difficulty. However, I want the reassurance that if a big body of opinion wants something debated, we will all be obliged to debate it and give it the full parliamentary process.

David Howarth: I agree with every word that the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) said, and I do not intend to add to his contribution. I shall, however, make a few points that have not been made in our debate.
	Our debate has focused on two amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) that I am happy to support. Amendment (c) to Government amendment No. 46 removes from the Government's so-called veto—it is not, in fact, a veto—the requirement on the Committee to consider various things under clauses 2 and 3. New clause 14 attempts to provide a genuine parliamentary veto. I wish to make only one point about amendment (c). Yesterday, the Government were keen to tell us that their judicial review of ministerial discretion did not require the insertion of the word, "reasonably", in the Bill. That creates a problem, as what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. The word, "reasonably", does not appear in Government amendment No. 46, but "considers" does. That leaves scope for judicial review, as long as the problem of the Bill of Rights is overcome, as the hon. Member for Cannock Chase(Dr. Wright) said.
	The Government should therefore say categorically in reply to the debate that they do not intend the amendment to override provisions in the Bill of Rights that forbid the courts from interfering with what happens in the House. However, as the hon. Gentleman said, if they say that that statutory form of words is not intended to have legal effect, why have they introduced the provision, as there does not appear to be an enforcement mechanism? They are therefore left in an obvious dilemma: either they add words to the statute that do not have any effect, or they must do what should always be done in the circumstances—if one does not want words to have effect, one leaves the matter to convention or to the Standing Orders ofthe House, which are not justiciable. I fail to see why the Government have not taken that route.
	My main argument concerns new clause 14. The procedural protections against the misuse of the Bill are still required, because yesterday changes were made to the purposes for which the Bill can be used and to the subject matter to which it can apply. It can no longer be used to change itself, or to change the Human Rights Act 1998. However, we did not debate a far more important restriction—the proposal that the Bill should not be used to change any of the country's constitutional arrangements. We did not discuss that amendment, so it is possible to use the Bill for those purposes. Yesterday, we examined the example of changes to trial by jury, which is not protected by the Human Rights Act. The Bill could be used to make dramatic changes to that right, and it is still possible to reform local government using an order under the Bill. There is therefore a great need for procedural protections, which is why we have proposed such protections in new clause 14 in addition to the so-called Committee veto, which, as everyone knows, is not a veto.
	The only argument against our proposal is that it will set a dangerous precedent. That argument suggests that we should not do the right thing now for fear that our slightly dim successors will not be able to tell the difference between the problem that we face and the problem that they face. Nevertheless, new clause 14 is not a departure, because there are such mechanisms, albeit with a slightly different construction, in Standing Orders. Standing Order No. 92 deals with what happens when a Bill has been considered by a Second Reading Committee or by the Scottish Grand Committee. The Report stage could take place in a Special Committee or in a Scottish Grand Committee. Standing Order No. 92 says that if a motion is introduced in the House to allow for that and 20 Members rise in their place and object,
	"the Speaker shall declare that the noes have it."
	Standing Orders already provide a blocking mechanism on procedure that requires a fuller hearing of the matter—in this case, the Report stage—than would otherwise be the case. That is precisely what we are trying to do in new clause 14.

Patrick McFadden: With the Deputy Speaker's permission, I am happy to do so.
	The legal effect of new clause 19 relates to the power to remove or reduce burdens. The purpose for which the power can be exercised contains two alternatives. The first is the removing or reducing of any burden resulting for any person directly or indirectly from legislation. The second is removing or reducing the overall burdens resulting for any person directly or indirectly from legislation.
	Removing or reducing a burden from one person may increase the burdens upon others, so the first alternative could permit an overall increase on persons as a whole. For example, where a regulatory regime is being placed on a risk basis, costs on low-risk businesses could go down, while costs on high-risk businesses may go up.
	The second alternative requires a removal or reduction of burdens overall, although this would permit the imposition of new burdens where the overall effect was a removal or reduction of burdens. This is similar to the position under the 2001 Act; if a burden is removed, new burdens may be added. Orders as a whole, including any new burdens, must meet the safeguards, including, for example, being proportionate to the policy objective of the order.
	In particular, I draw the hon. Gentleman's attention to the precondition in clause 3(2)(c), which requires that Ministers consider that the provision as a whole
	"strikes a fair balance between the public interest and the interests of any person adversely affected by it".
	This precondition, which is clearly particularly relevant where burdens are imposed or increased, also mirrors the existing position under the 2001 Act. The explanatory document will include both a summary of consultation responses, and an assessment of the extent to which an order to be made under new clause 19 removes or reduces burdens. Also, a detailed impact assessment would be provided, where appropriate, and these documents would explain the rationale behind the proposals.
	The expectation is that in most cases the overall burden will have been reduced, but for the reason stated above the Government believe that we need the flexibility to add burdens as well as remove them, if these burdens are to be useful in delivering better regulation.

Patrick McFadden: The position is symmetrical because the statutory veto relates to the powers in the Bill, which is the point made by my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office in her intervention on the Chairman of the Procedure Committee. We were asked to introduce a statutory veto, but we were also asked to narrow the powers in the Bill. The Government amendments include a statutory veto, which relates to the narrowing of the powers in the Bill that the House agreed yesterday.
	In the context of amendments to focus the order-making power more explicitly on better regulation objectives, it was considered appropriate for the veto to provide a symmetrical and focused check on that power. The Government consider it right that proposals are judged on the extent to which they deliver the regulatory reform agenda, and it is right that the proposals are judged on whether the conditions in the Bill are met.
	First and foremost, the veto is intended to present an effective and workable mechanism to protect against the abuse of the order-making power in the Bill. To that end, the veto builds directly upon the strengths of the existing system for scrutinising orders. The conditions to which the veto is tied are consistent with those contained in the Standing Orders of relevant Committees under the 2001 Act, conditions against which Committees have previously tested and, in one case, rejected regulatory reform orders. The Government believe that those conditions continue to represent key indicators on whether a proposal is suitable for delivery by order.
	Additionally, the veto addresses concerns surrounding a Minister's capacity to implement Law Commission recommendations "with changes", which has raised questions about the extent to which a recommendation can legitimately be altered when it is delivered by order. In a case in which a Committee judges a recommendation to have been changed to such a degree that the recommendation can no longer be seen to implement a recommendation of the Law Commission, the Committee can exercise the statutory veto. As has been noted, however, the Government acknowledge the need for continued discussion about the most appropriate way in which to take forward the provision of a veto for Committees, which is a delicate issue. As was said yesterday, one of the reasons why the Bill is delicate is that it touches not only on what the Executive may want to, but on the relationship between the Executive and Parliament, which is why we are open to continued discussion on those matters.

Amendment made: No. 10, in page 1, line 4, leave out Clause 1.—[Mr. McFadden.]

Amendment made: No. 11, in page 2, line 10, leave out Clause 2.—[Mr. McFadden.]

Amendments made: No. 41, in page 7, line 34 [Clause 13], leave out '21-day' and insert '30-day'.
	No. 42, in page 7, line 43 [Clause 13], leave out '21-day' and insert '30-day'.
	No. 43, in page 8, line 4 [Clause 13], leave out '21-day' and insert '30-day'.
	No. 44, in page 8, line 11 [Clause 13], leave out '21-day' and insert '30-day'.
	No. 45, in page 8, line 11 [Clause 13], leave out '21' and insert '30'. —[Mr. McFadden.]
	Amendment proposed: No. 46, in page 8, line 17 [Clause 14], leave out subsection (2) and insert—
	'(2) The Minister may make an order in the terms of the draft order subject to the following provisions of this section.
	(2A) The Minister may not make an order in the terms of the draft order if either House of Parliament so resolves within the 40-day period.
	(2B) A committee of either House charged with reporting on the draft order may, at any time after the expiry of the 30-day period and before the expiry of the 40-day period, recommend under this subsection that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the draft order.
	(2C) A recommendation may be made under subsection (2B) only if the committee considers that—
	(a) the provision made by the draft order does not serve the purpose specified in section (Power to remove or reduce burdens)(2), (Power to promote regulatory principles)(2) or (Power to implement Law Commission recommendations)(2) (as the case may be);
	(b) any relevant condition in section 3(2) is not satisfied in relation to any provision of the draft order referred to in section 3(1); or
	(c) the condition in section 3(4) is not satisfied in relation to any provision of the draft order referred to in section 3(3).
	(2D) Where a recommendation is made by a committee of either House under subsection (2B) in relation to a draft order, the Minister may not make an order in the terms of the draft order unless the recommendation is, in the same Session, rejected by resolution of that House.'—[Mr. McFadden.]
	Amendment proposed to the proposed amendment: (a), in line 5, leave out from 'with' to end of line 18 and insert
	'responsibility for this matter may, at any time after the expiry of the 30-day period and before the expiry of the 40-day period, recommend that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the draft order.'.—[Mr. Greg Knight.]
	Question put, That the amendment be made:—
	The House divided: Ayes 200, Noes 258.

Clause 14
	 — 
	Negative resolution procedure

Amendments made: No. 47, in page 8, line 20 [Clause 14], leave out 'subsection (2)' and insert 'this section'.
	No. 48, in page 8, line 22 [Clause 14], leave out 'subsection (2)' and insert 'this section—
	(a) the "30-day period" has the meaning given by section 13(7); and
	(b) '.
	No. 49, in page 8, line 24 [Clause 14], at end insert—
	'(5) For the purpose of calculating the 40-day period in a case where a recommendation is made under subsection (2B) by a committee of either House but the recommendation is rejected by that House under subsection (2D), no account shall be taken of any day between the day on which the recommendation was made and the day on which the recommendation was rejected.'.—[Mr. McFadden.]

Amendments made: No. 50, in page 8, line 31 [Clause 15], at end insert—
	'(2A) However, a committee of either House charged with reporting on the draft order may, at any time after the expiry of the 30-day period and before the expiry of the 40-day period, recommend under this subsection that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the draft order.
	(2B) A recommendation under subsection (2A) may be made only if the committee considers that—
	(a) the provision made by the draft order does not serve the purpose specified in section (Power to remove or reduce burdens)(2), (Power to promote regulatory principles)(2) or (Power to implement Law Commission recommendations)(2) (as the case may be);
	(b) any relevant condition in section 3(2) is not satisfied in relation to any provision of the draft order referred to in section 3(1); or
	(c) the condition in section 3(4) is not satisfied in relation to any provision of the draft order referred to in section 3(3).
	(2C) Where a recommendation is made by a committee of either House under subsection (2A) in relation to a draft order, no proceedings may be taken in relation to the draft order in that House under subsection (2) unless the recommendation is, in the same Session, rejected by resolution of that House.'.
	No. 51, in page 8, line 34 [Clause 15], leave out 'subsection (2)' and insert 'this section—
	(a) the "30-day period" has the meaning given by section 13(7); and
	(b) '.
	No. 52, in page 8, line 34 [Clause 15], at end insert—
	'(5) For the purpose of calculating the 40-day period in a case where a recommendation is made under subsection (2A) by a committee of either House but the recommendation is rejected by that House under subsection (2C), no account shall be taken of any day between the day on which the recommendation was made and the day on which the recommendation was rejected.'.—[Mr. McFadden.]

Amendments made: No. 53, in page 9, line 5 [Clause 16], leave out from 'statement' to end of line 6 and insert—
	'(a) stating whether any representations were made under subsection (2)(a); and
	(b) if any representations were so made, giving details of them.'.
	No. 54, in page 9, line 8 [Clause 16], after subsection (4) insert—
	'(4A) However, a committee of either House charged with reporting on the draft order may, at any time after the laying of a statement under subsection (3) and before the draft order is approved by that House under subsection (4), recommend under this subsection that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the draft order.
	(4B) A recommendation under subsection (4A) may be made only if the committee considers that—
	(a) the provision made by the draft order does not serve the purpose specified in section (Power to remove or reduce burdens)(2), (Power to promote regulatory principles)(2) or (Power to implement Law Commission recommendations)(2) (as the case may be);
	(b) any relevant condition in section 3(2) is not satisfied in relation to any provision of the draft order referred to in section 3(1); or
	(c) the condition in section 3(4) is not satisfied in relation to any provision of the draft order referred to in section 3(3).
	(4C) Where a recommendation is made by a committee of either House under subsection (4A) in relation to a draft order, no proceedings may be taken in relation to the draft order in that House under subsection (4) unless the recommendation is, in the same Session, rejected by resolution of that House.'.
	No. 55, in page 9, line 18 [Clause 16], after subsection (6) insert—
	'(6A) However, a committee of either House charged with reporting on the revised draft order may, at any time after the revised draft order is laid under subsection (5) and before it is approved by that House under subsection (6), recommend under this subsection that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the revised draft order.
	(6B) A recommendation under subsection (6A) may be made only if the committee considers that—
	(a) the provision made by the revised draft order does not serve the purpose specified in section (Power to remove or reduce burdens)(2), (Power to promote regulatory principles)(2) or (Power to implement Law Commission recommendations)(2) (as the case may be);
	(b) any relevant condition in section 3(2) is not satisfied in relation to any provision of the revised draft order referred to in section 3(1); or
	(c) the condition in section 3(4) is not satisfied in relation to any provision of the revised draft order referred to in section 3(3).
	(6C) Where a recommendation is made by a committee of either House under subsection (6A) in relation to a revised draft order, no proceedings may be taken in relation to the revised draft order in that House under subsection (6) unless the recommendation is, in the same Session, rejected by resolution of that House.'.—[Mr. McFadden.]

Hilary Armstrong: If the hon. Gentleman is patient, I will explain. Regulation itself is not a bad thing; it is the manner in which it is imposed it that is the problem. [Interruption.] If the hon. Gentleman will have a little patience, I will deal with that point now.
	The Government's better regulation agenda is designed to reduce burdens without reducing the effectiveness of regulation or its outcomes, so we are not going to stop introducing new regulations when they are needed. The Government make no apologies for continuing to regulate to improve standards in public services, to promote competition, to ensure fairness at work, to help industry and to provide protection for consumers and the environment. Indeed, one of my right hon. Friends said to me earlier, "I hope that we're not so against regulation that we're going to send children back to work up chimneys again." Of course we are not.
	The order-making powers in part 1 are intended to take their place among the number of mechanisms designed to turn the aims of better regulation into reality for the end user on the ground—for those in business who create wealth and jobs in our economy, and those in our public services, voluntary and charitable organisations who improve the lives of our citizens.
	The World Bank survey published in September 2005 rated the UK second in the EU and ninth in the world for best business conditions. That and other independent reports show that the UK is doing well, but as I have said, the challenge from global economic development is huge. We must ensure that the UK remains competitive.
	The order-making powers in part 1 will not be the appropriate or even the necessary mechanism for every better regulation initiative. In many instances, however, they will provide real tools, where appropriate, for Departments to pursue their ambitious plans for removing unnecessary regulatory burdens without having to fight for precious time on the Floor of this House.
	The order-making powers as defined by the amended Bill are more fit for purpose than the powers in the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 have proved to be.

Question accordingly negatived.
	Bill read the Third time, and passed, with amendments.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Roy.]

Ian Gibson: I am delighted to have the opportunity to talk about bowel cancer,because many members of the public and Members of the House have experience of members of their families, or perhaps themselves, having the prognostication of bowel cancer and know of its effects on their lives. We have a real opportunity in this country to make a difference on bowel cancer, which is often called colorectal cancer, but it is my contention that we are not doing that as quickly as, or to the extent that, we ought to be.
	I do not want to go into the numbers, although we conventionally talk in such debates about the numbers of people who develop and die from a cancer. However, hon. Members can take it from me that the figure is up there in the thousands and thousands and that the problem is very serious indeed. The research that has gone on in this country and the United States will undoubtedly help us to tackle not only bowel cancer, but many other cancers. For example, in the United States, at the Johns Hopkins university in Baltimore, Bert Vogelstein has discovered something that is quite magnificent in the sense of what it tells us about the development of cancers. He has shown that five or seven individual events can take place, all of which are necessary to develop the full-blown cancer, which sadly can kill. The genetic changes that he has identified are an important illustration of what research can do. The interesting thing is t that the order in which they happen is not A, B, C, D, E, F, G and so on, but A-C, E-F and so on in different individuals. As a New Statesman article next week will prove, that shows that cancer research is telling us much more about how cancers progress from one stage to the next. It is not that someone has it and everything else is inevitable. The research shows that early detection not only of a genetic event, but of other events as well, is important and can help to save lives. My contention is that we can save thousands of people's lives if we take the subject much more seriously.
	Many people will say that bowel cancer is caused by diet and we can prevent it by taking care of what we eat. Lots is going on in that sector, but it is not the subject of the debate. We must have a process of screening individuals, and it is which individuals and when we screen them that is the subject of the debate going on not just in this country, but across the world.
	We have been lucky with some of the research into bowel cancer because we can say things about the disease that we cannot say about other important cancers. The major screening programmes are for cervical cancer, breast cancer and bowel cancer, but bowel cancer is the only disease for which we have additional information about the stages that happen in the process. We have not quite reached that point with the other cancers.
	How do we screen individuals? People can look at their stools and faeces—I cannot use rude words in the Chamber, but I hope that people know what stools and faeces are—for blood that might be present. They can do it themselves by taking the stool and faeces and passing it on to the experts to analyse whether blood has been exuded from the body. If it has been, further tests can be done. The faecal occult test—it sounds like a religious group—is used for men and women aged between 60 and 69. It is very effective in what it does, because the next stage illustrates what we can do with the result. However, we need to ask why 60 to 69—why not 70, 75, 80 and so on? That is true for many other screening technologies, including breast cancer.
	If there is evidence that blood is exuded by an individual, the next process is flexible sigmoidoscopy, which has been used in pilot studies of people aged over 50. A small flexible tube, with a camera attached, is inserted through a person's rear passage. We would not all welcome that, but it does happen. I and others I know have been through that. It is quite exciting to lie there and look at one's insides—parts of our bodies that we have not seen before—on a screen. It is better done after lunch and dinner, of course, and certainly after breakfast. However, it is interesting what one can see.
	It is possible to see lesions and polyps on the screen. Polyps are little structures that may have developed at a certain stage in someone's lifetime, perhaps over a period of eating certain foods, or whatever the factors are that induce their existence. When the doctor sees those structures, he gets the message. One can eliminate those polyps, which appear at an extremely early stage in the development of bowel cancer, and people can survive for many years if they do not develop the disease. Flexible sigmoidoscopy is an important procedure in identifying the early stages of bowel cancer.
	The cancer can develop beyond that stage and, sadly, it has done so in most of the cases with which I am familiar, including that of my brother. Very little can be done, as the cancer has entered a different phase and spread to the liver. In such cases, even surgery will not extend someone's life by many years, so early detection is extremely important. Removal of the polyps is even more important, as mutations, changes and so on can be detected in those structures. Rectal insertion is not the only technology used to tackle the disease. New scanners have been developed that allow us to look at people's insides, so we can discover the polyps in their bowels without inserting an instrument in their rear passage.
	We can argue about whether people should be screened at 50, 60, 69 and so on, but we need to consider the issue of take-up. Thankfully, the Government have introduced screening, but take-up is only 60 per cent. That is understandable, as people do not want to undergo such a test. Men, in particular, do not like such procedures or the effects on their bodies. The position is even worse for certain groups, where take-up is less than 60 per cent. Screening is not worth while if people do not use it. Recently, I received a paper from Warwick, De Montfort and Essex universities on take-up among black and ethnic communities. Before rectal insertion, a faecal occult blood test is necessary: people collect three samples over three days—goodness knows where they keep them, as they cannot be stored in a fridge with food—and send them for analysis. For various cultural reasons, black and ethnic communities do not like to take that test. That is understandable—my researchers, who come from different cultural backgrounds, said that it was disgusting. The take-up among much of the multi-cultural community therefore falls below 60 per cent. to 30 per cent. and even lower. We await better tests, as many people are not taking up that test.
	The national health service records the results of the tests, and flexible sigmoidoscopy is carried out. The problem of take-up has been tackled by Cancer BACUP, which has produced leaflets encouraging people to take the test. It has a great deal of experience of talking to people with breast and cervical cancer, urging them to take tests that can save their lives. However, low take-up is a huge dilemma, and I urge the Government to increase it. I do not think that we will ever achieve 100 per cent. take-up, but we can do better than 20 or 30 per cent. in certain communities. Indeed, we can do better than 60 per cent.
	There is inequality in our society, and not just in black and ethnic groups. The politics of cancer in the United Kingdom is the politics of deprivation and the poverty of many people. Not only do they suffer more pollution and eat cheaper, poor quality food, but they do not take up the diagnostic tests. I run the all-party cancer group. Our conference this year, "Britain against Cancer", will be about the inequalities in our society, where certain groups of people who come from certain backgrounds do not take up the tests that are available.
	I urge the Government to regard that as a priority and to do more about it. It is all right to say, "Eat more fruit. Eat more organic food," but as I know, the surge in the green vote in Norwich, which is all about eating organic fruit, involves the middle classes. On the working class estates in my constituency, people do not eat organic foods. They go to Lidl and buy food as cheaply as they can. The difference in the diseases that they get reflects the difference in lifestyle. We must take on the class problem and factors such as what people eat, where they live, the pollution that they encounter, and so on. I urge the Government to do more about that.
	I know that the Department of Health is trying to do more and to induce people to be tested. The Department must speak much more to the relevant charities and groups. Bowel Cancer UK and Beating Bowel Cancer have great experience of talking to the population and thinking about the problems. We need a taskforce to encourage people to come forward and take the test.
	What have the Government done? In no way am I suggesting that they have done nothing. They have, for example, set up various pilot schemes, which have been quite successful. In certain parts of the midlands they have saved around 250 lives. Saving 250 lives by testing for bowel cancer is pretty good news. We could make that 20,500 lives if we extended it to other parts of the country. There have been some delays in getting money into such programmes, but in April 2006, after a little flurry here and there, we managed to get £10 million for the first year of a bowel cancer screening programme, with the help of the national cancer screening programme. That is good, but what will happen in years 2 and 3?
	At a Britain against Cancer conference, the then Minister spoke of a three-year programme tackling bowel cancer. There is some scepticism about that. I want to hear tonight, please, that years 2 and 3 will happen. We have a hub and a screening centre, but we promised that there would be five hubs and 13 screening centres across the country. It has been proven that the one existing hub and the screening that is going on can save lives, and we could save many more lives. There is very good news. It is a winner, and do we need winners in this area of health! Does the Minister agree?
	When people die of bowel cancer, I find it difficult not to wonder why the disease was not diagnosed sooner, why the treatment was not effective, why the polyp was not removed and so on, and why their lives were not saved. That is a challenge for the Government. We need to discuss how we will raise awareness, engage the charities, get leaflets out, engage with the communities and at what level, to make sure they know that there is good news and that the technology for dealing with the disease is improving.
	We need to know where the programme will happen. I will love it when it is rolled out in Norwich and Great Yarmouth—everything happens there eventually—and the pilots seem to have been effective.
	We need to know whether the Government have estimated how many lives might be saved, and I wonder whether the NHS can find the extra money. It was said that some £35 million would be found over three years, but will that happen? When will we know that the money is in place for years 2 and 3?
	We must consider the capacity issues. What about the personnel who will conduct the tests? We need nurse specialists to look after patients, cancer doctors, pharmacists and stoma nurses. I do not think that people will not respond because of the nature of the cancer.
	I want to hear from the Minister tonight that the programme will happen over the next three years, the three years after that and the three years after that, because it is a win-win situation. If the programme is successful in bowel cancer, progress will be made on prostate cancer, because there will be discoveries in that field, too—there will be discoveries across the spectrum of cancers over the next few years. We can show in this country that the best treatment for any particular cancer comes from early screening.